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BLURRING THE LINES: WHEN THE “BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD” FALL TO THE WAYSIDE.
AN ANALYSIS OF OHIO’S SERIOUS YOUTHFUL
OFFENDER STATUTE.
Emily L. Barth*

I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]rial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than one
wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.” 1

Historically, juvenile courts were designed to appear fatherly and
benevolent—seeking to provide for the best interests of the child rather
than to inflict punishment, as in the adult system. This is consistent with
the stated legislative purpose of the Ohio juvenile justice system. 2
However, the juvenile justice system has evolved considerably since its
inception in the late nineteenth century, 3 especially with the
implementation of blended sentencing systems like Ohio’s Serious
Youthful Offender (SYO) statute. The present realities of the Ohio
juvenile justice system are out of sync with the mission of the Ohio
Department of Youth Services (ODYS). 4 In many jurisdictions the “best
interests of the child” rehabilitative model has faded to the background
as more punitive and adult criminal sanctions are imposed upon youth
sentenced in juvenile court.
This Comment argues that an Ohio juvenile offender, receiving a
discretionary blended sentence under the Ohio SYO statute, 5 has a right

* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 n.23 (1968) (quoting SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL
BY JURY 164 (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1956)).
2. See In re Caldwell, 666 N.E.2d 1367, 1368 (Ohio 1996) (“to provide for the care, protection,
and mental and physical development of children, to protect the public from the wrongful acts
committed by juvenile delinquents, and to rehabilitate errant children and bring them back to productive
citizenship”). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (2002).
3. See In re Anderson, 748 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Ohio 2001). In re Anderson recounts the history of
the juvenile courts.
4. See generally Ohio Department of Youth Services, Mission Statement,
http://www.dys.ohio.gov/dnn (last visited November 11, 2009) (“to encourage positive change in the
lives of youthful offenders through collaborative partnerships and culturally relevant therapeutic and
academic interventions that support public safety and prepare youth to lead productive lives”).
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13 (2002). Section 2152.13 (D)(2)(a)(i) addresses the factors
a judge must consider when applying a discretionary serious youthful offender dispositional sentence.
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to a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding as articulated under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution 6 and sections 5 7 and 10 8
of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, where the juvenile court judge, in
addition to a traditional juvenile disposition, is authorized to impose an
adult criminal sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed
this issue in State v. D.H. 9 The Ohio Supreme Court held a jury
determination on the imposition of a SYO dispositional sentence is
unnecessary, 10 and that, given the juvenile system’s goal of
rehabilitation, leaving the determination to a judge does not offend
fundamental fairness or notions of due process. 11 This Comment argues
that a juvenile should be afforded the right to a jury trial when the state
seeks to punish him as an adult by imposing adult prison terms upon
him.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the history and
background of the federal approach to juvenile jury trial rights and the
parens patriae rationale behind the juvenile justice system. Part III
discusses the development and rationale of the utilization of blended
sentences in the juvenile justice system. Part IV outlines Ohio’s juvenile
justice system and analyzes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in
State v. D.H.
Part V argues that juvenile offenders receiving a discretionary
blended sentence should be entitled to a jury trial right at the
dispositional stage of their trial based on existing case law and the plain
language of Ohio’s SYO statute. Finally, Part VI of this Comment
concludes that juveniles receiving a discretionary sentence under Ohio’s
SYO statute would be best served with access to complete jury trial
rights at both the adjudicatory and dispositional phases, and,
accordingly, State v. D.H. was wrongly decided.
II. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The United States juvenile justice system came into being in the late
1890s in an era of unprecedented industrial and urban development, a
time when the United States was also dealing with many social problems
resulting from massive immigration. 12 Prior to this time, juveniles and
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (amended 1912).
Id. art. I, § 10.
State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2775 (2009).
Id. at 217.
Id.
See generally David Shichor, Historical and Current Trends in American Juvenile Justice, 34
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adults were treated similarly under the criminal common law. 13 Part II
of this Comment will briefly explore the historical development of the
juvenile justice system in the United States and discuss the original
goals of the juvenile justice model, with particular focus on the model of
parens patriae. Part II will conclude with a summation of the Supreme
Court’s gradual expansion of procedural due process rights to juvenile
defendants, culminating with the decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
which withheld the expansion of jury trial rights to the juvenile court
setting.
A. Historical Development and Original Goals of the Juvenile Justice
System
In response to the emergence of pauperism and the development of
prisons at the end of the nineteenth century, moralist proponents created
correctional institutions designed specifically for juvenile delinquents. 14
Since 1899, when America’s first juvenile court was founded in
Chicago, 15 two primary assumptions have governed the administration
of juvenile justice systems: (1) that states should operate them in parens
patriae 16 for the best interests of the child 17 and (2) that states should be
given flexibility in doing so. 18 Despite the lofty aspirations of the
juvenile justice system, “the informality and private nature of the
proceedings resulted in little public oversight and led to arbitrary
dispositions with indeterminate and punitive sentences.” 19 In 1966,
Supreme Court Justice Abraham Fortas questioned the juvenile justice
system when he noted that “there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.” 20 Although the United States
JUV. & FAM.CT. J. 61 (Aug. 1983).
13. See generally Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
14. See generally JAMES C. HOWELL, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 47 (1997). See
also, e.g., Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 457–58 (1981).
15. Mack, supra note 13, at 107.
16. Stanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1192–93 (1970).
17. Id. at 1230. See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 568 (1971); Steven
Friedland, The Rhetoric of Juvenile Rights, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 139 (1995) (quoting Mack,
supra note 13, at 119–20).
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19. Courtney P. Fain, What’s In a Name?
The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile
“Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 500 (2008).
20. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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Supreme Court has extended nearly all adult procedural due process
rights to juveniles, 21 the Court has not granted juveniles a constitutional
right to a jury trial. 22
B. The Parens Patriae Model
One theory behind the origin of juvenile law is the doctrine of parens
patriae, which literally means “parent of the country.” The doctrine of
parens patriae legitimized the state’s exercise of sovereign power of
guardianship and protection over persons under a legal disability,
including infancy. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile
court system is “theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the
child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct.” 23
Juvenile courts were founded to remove children from criminal
proceedings and to “get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt
with as a criminal.” 24
The social acceptance of the doctrine of parens patriae, and the
viewpoint of the judge as the benevolent and fatherly guide, fell out of
favor in the 1960s. The juvenile justice system was gradually perceived
as more punitive than rehabilitative in nature. Also, during the 1960s,
civil liberties attorneys and criminologists discovered that many youth in
the juvenile justice system were treated punitively in the juvenile court
but did not have the due process protections provided to adults in the
criminal justice system. 25 Subpart II(C) discusses the gradual extension
21. These rights will be discussed fully in subpart II(C) of this Comment.
22. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971) (plurality opinion).
23. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555.
24. Mack, supra note 13, at 110. Note the legal doctrine of parens patriae legitimated
intervention in the “best interests” of the child offender, and supported the juvenile justice concept that
juvenile courts conducted civil rather than criminal proceedings. The doctrine of parens patriae was
developed around the concept of an ideal juvenile court judge—a judge with the qualities of a good
father, a brilliant psychologist, and a dedicated social worker—who would address questions about the
juvenile defendant beyond concerns of guilt or innocence. Id. Justice Fortas further expanded upon this
belief in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) when he stated:
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to
his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to
liberty but to custody.’ He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If
his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions—that is, if the child
is ‘delinquent’—the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any
rights, because he has none. It merely provides the ‘custody’ to which the child is
entitled.
Id. (footnote omitted).
25. See generally Eric Jensen, An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System,
in JUVENILE LAW VIOLATORS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 83 (Eric L. Jensen and Jorgen Jepsen eds., 2006).
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of due process rights to juvenile offenders in the juvenile justice system
and the general departure from the purely parens patriae rationale
behind the juvenile court model.
C. The Supreme Court’s Stance: Kent, In re Gault, In re Winship, and
McKeiver
In the nearly seven decades that followed the implementation of
United States juvenile courts, the Supreme Court did not hear a single
case regarding the structure of the juvenile court system. 26 However,
beginning in the mid–1960s, the Court undertook a systematic reexamination of the procedural manifestations of the parens patriae
model of the juvenile court. The lack of constitutional protections
afforded to juvenile offenders led to a new wave of reform in the 1960s
and was the result of little progress and significant defects in the juvenile
court system. 27 This subpart briefly examines the United States
Supreme Court cases that extended procedural due process rights to
juveniles. This subpart also examines the Supreme Court’s unvarying
reasoning, despite the increasingly punitive nature of juvenile courts, for
refusing to extend a jury trial right to juveniles.
1. One Toe in the Water: Kent v. United States
Kent v. United States, 28 one of the first United States Supreme Court
cases addressing the rights of juvenile offenders, dealt narrowly with the
process by which youth offenders are transferred to criminal court to be
tried as adults. 29
In Kent, Morris Kent’s fingerprints were matched to fingerprints
found at the scene of a crime in which a woman had been robbed and
raped. As Kent was sixteen years old at the time, he was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court. 30 Kent
was apprehended and taken into custody by the police. 31 The police,
without a guardian or court appointed officer present, interrogated Kent.
Kent was then detained without proper arraignment or determination by

26. W.J. Keegan, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L. J. 811, 812 (1977).
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). By the 1960s, problems with the juvenile court system
“demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure.” Id.
28. 383 U.S. 541.
29. Id. at 552.
30. Id. at 543.
31. Id.
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a judicial officer of probable cause for almost a week. 32 In addition, the
juvenile court waived its jurisdiction without holding a hearing or ruling
on motions submitted by Kent’s counsel. 33 Kent was ultimately indicted
by a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and sentenced to serve a total of thirty to ninety years in
prison. 34
The Kent Court recognized the possibility that children in juvenile
court suffer because they do not enjoy the procedural safeguards that
criminal courts extend to adult defendants, nor do they benefit from the
rehabilitative care that the juvenile justice system promised. 35 The
Court also recognized there was significant evidence that some juvenile
courts 36 lack “the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at
least with respect to children charged with law violation.” 37 Noting that
a decision on waiver of jurisdiction and transfer can bring hefty
differences in sentencing, the Court determined juveniles are entitled to
certain procedures during the transfer process, including a hearing,
access by representative counsel to the probation records, and a
statement by the juvenile court giving the reasons for its decision. 38 The
Court’s holding that the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution applied to waiver hearings in juvenile proceedings was
especially relevant because the Court had not previously applied the Due
Process Clause to children in juvenile court. 39

32. Id. at 544–45.
33. Id. at 544–46. Kent’s counsel promptly made known to the juvenile court his intention to
oppose any waiver from juvenile to district court. Id. While Kent was initially detained, his counsel
arranged for examination of Kent by two psychiatrists and a psychologist. Id. He also filed a motion for
a hearing on the question of waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, along with an affidavit of a psychiatrist
certifying that petitioner was a victim of severe psychopathology. Id. Kent’s counsel also moved for
the juvenile court to give him access to Kent’s social service file. The juvenile court judge did not rule
on these motions, held no hearing, and did not confer with Kent, Kent’s parents, or Kent’s counsel. Id.
34. Id. at 548, 550.
35. Id. at 556.
36. The Court specifically cited the District of Columbia Juvenile Court, where the Kent case
takes place. Id. at 555.
37. Id. 555–56.
38. Id. at 557.
39. Id.
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2. A Big Splash of Procedural Due Process Rights for Juveniles: In re
Gault
In Gault, 40 the Supreme Court built upon the holding in Kent and
transformed the juvenile court into a very different system than that
embodied by the traditional parens patriae model. Decided less than a
year after Kent, Gault is still considered one of the most important cases
regarding children’s rights in juvenile proceedings. Declaring that
“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone,” 41 the Court set a new constitutional standard, significantly
altering the course of the nation’s juvenile courts. 42
Gerald Gault and a friend, both minors, were taken into custody as the
result of a verbal complaint made by Gault’s neighbor. 43 When Gault
was arrested and placed in detention, his parents were not given notice
of the event. The petition filed by the deputy probation officer was not
served on the Gaults. Additionally, at the subsequent hearing, none of
the participants were sworn in, no transcript or recording was made, and
no memorandum or record of the proceedings was prepared. 44 After a
second undocumented hearing, Gault was adjudicated delinquent and
committed to a detention center until he turned twenty-one. 45
Challenging the rationale behind the traditional parens patriae model,
the Gault Court asserted that a lack of constitutional safeguards does not
result in lowering juvenile crime rates or rehabilitating offenders.46
After applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Gault Court expanded the rights of juvenile offenders to include
notice of the charges brought against them, 47 the right to representation
by counsel, 48 the right to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, 49 and the right to protection against self-incrimination. 50
Despite the Court’s vast expansion of procedural due process rights for
40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Id. at 13.
42. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A Promise
Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (2008).
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. The neighbor complained that the two boys had made a lewd
telephone call to her. Id. At the time of the telephone call, Gault was still subject to a six month’s
probation order from the juvenile court. Id.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 5–7. Note, Gault’s neighbor, the complaining witness, was never made to appear
before the court at either hearing. Id.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 56–57.
50. Id. at 55.
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juveniles, the Gault majority maintained that children and adults are
sufficiently different in nature to justify a separate court system. 51
3. Establishing a Standard of Proof in the Juvenile Justice System: In re
Winship
Three years after Gault, the Court continued its expansion of juvenile
rights in In re Winship. 52 The Winship Court addressed whether the
reasonable doubt standard should be applied to juvenile criminal
adjudications, as in adult criminal adjudications. Prior to this decision,
the state, in juvenile criminal adjudications, was only required to prove a
juvenile defendant’s guilt by a preponderance of the evidence. 53
Winship, a twelve-year-old boy, was accused of stealing cash from a
woman’s pocketbook. 54 The crime, if committed by an adult, would
constitute larceny. 55 The New York Family Court judge noted that the
available proof of Winship’s guilt might not establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but rejected Winship’s contention that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 56
Winship was convicted and sentenced to an eighteen–month
incarceration, which could be extended into a six year commitment. 57
After focusing on the right of adults to have guilt proven beyond a
reasonable doubt—“[t]he same considerations that demand extreme
caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the
innocent child” 58 —the Court held the evidentiary standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt must be applied in the adjudication of
juveniles as delinquent. 59 Explaining that the reasonable doubt standard
was essential to protect society from questioning whether those
condemned were actually guilty, the Winship Court concluded the
reasonable doubt standard is vital to the American criminal justice

51. See Mlyniec, supra note 42, at n.15.
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 359–60. There was conflicting testimony that the salesperson who identified Winship
as the thief was in another part of the store at the time of the theft. See Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty
and Juvenile Justice For All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 854 (1994).
55. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 360.
56. Id. Rather, the judge relied upon a New York Family Court statute that provided the
determination of proof at a juvenile adjudicatory hearing must be based on a preponderance of the
evidence.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 365.
59. Id. at 368.
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system. 60
4. Everyone out of the Pool: McKeiver and the Juvenile Jury Trial Right
The Court’s expansion of due process rights to juveniles came to a
dramatic halt in 1971, with the McKeiver 61 plurality decision. One year
after deciding Winship, the McKeiver Court held a jury trial was not
constitutionally required in juvenile court proceedings, 62 although the
right to a jury trial is a constitutional safeguard in adult criminal trials.
Joseph McKeiver, age sixteen, was charged with a series of three
felonies: robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. 63 McKeiver’s
request for a jury trial was denied. 64 McKeiver argued he should be
granted a jury trial because his juvenile court proceedings were
overwhelmingly similar to adult criminal trials. 65
The McKeiver Court disagreed with the defendant and offered three
reasons to support the Court’s position that a juvenile jury right is not a
fundamental right: (1) the adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court
is much less onerous than the conviction of a crime in the criminal
system; 66 (2) juvenile court judges handle cases differently than criminal
judges; 67 and (3) a jury trial is the one due process right that would most
disrupt and destroy the uniqueness of the juvenile court process. 68 The
McKeiver plurality also considered the possibility that a constitutionally
mandated jury trial would “remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully
adversary process,” thereby eliminating the “idealistic prospect of an
intimate, informal protective proceeding.” 69 The McKeiver Court
concluded that if the jury procedures of the adult criminal justice process
were adopted by the juvenile system, the need for a separate juvenile
justice system would no longer exist. 70
60. Id. at 363–64.
61. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 534–35.
64. Id. at 535.
65. Id. at 541–42. For example, the delinquency proceeding petition uses the language of an
indictment, prior to trial a juvenile is detained in a building substantially similar to an adult prison,
McKeiver’s counsel and the prosecution engaged in plea bargaining, motions to suppress are routinely
heard and decided, the usual rules of evidence are applied, customary common-law defenses are
available, the press and public are admitted in the court room, and once adjudged delinquent, a juvenile
may be confined until the age of majority in a prison-like environment. Id.
66. Id. at 540.
67. Id. at 541.
68. Id. at 540.
69. Id. at 545.
70. Id. at 551.
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Although the McKeiver Court prevented the federal expansion of
juvenile constitutional rights, it did leave room for state expansion. The
Court recognized that the promise of the juvenile court concept largely
depends on the availability of resources, public interest and
commitment, the willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause
and effect and cure. 71 With this in mind, the Court recognized that
states are free to experiment and seek new ways to solve the problems
posed by juvenile offenders. 72 The McKeiver Court explicitly stated that
although states are under no obligation to do so, they may adopt a
juvenile jury trial right in all cases or in certain kinds of cases, as they
see fit. 73
III. JUVENILE BLENDED SENTENCING STRUCTURES
There’s this tug of war going on between those who believe we’ve been
too soft on juveniles . . . and those that feel we treat juveniles differently
because we believe they can be reformed and rehabilitated . . . [Blended
sentencing is] really a marriage of convenience between those that want
to punish more and those that want to give kids one more chance. 74

A. Origins of Blended Sentence Statutes in Juvenile Courts
As the juvenile court parens patriae “best interests of the child”
rationale began to decline in the 1960s, 75 the juvenile courts began to
impose a more retributive rather than rehabilitative model of
punishment. 76 Three main factors accounted for the shift in philosophy
from rehabilitative to retributive. One factor was the extensive media
coverage of violent crimes by juveniles in the early 1990s that fueled
perceptions of a juvenile crime epidemic. Second, a philosophical shift
from rehabilitation to punishment resulted in states’ revision of their
transfer/waiver laws. Finally, there was an increase in the public view
that juvenile courts fail to punish adequately and that juvenile
71. Id. at 547.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Pam Belluck, Fighting Youth Crime, Some States Blend Adult and Juvenile Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998 (quoting John Stanoch, Chief Juvenile Court Judge for Hennepin County,
Minnesota). See also Richard E. Redding and James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American
Juvenile Courts, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 145 (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E.
Zimring, eds., 2000).
75. See generally Mack, supra note 13.
76. See Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals
Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 711–14 (1997).
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rehabilitation programs are ineffective. 77
Blended sentencing structures refer to the imposition of juvenile and
adult correctional sanctions on serious and violent juvenile offenders
who have been either adjudicated in juvenile court or convicted in
criminal court. 78 The underlying principle of blended sentencing
structures is one of compromise: “The idea is to give a young offender
some rope, enough to yank himself out of a life of crime—or to hang
himself and wind up in prison.” 79 Under blended sentencing structures,
when a case involves a minor, judges in criminal and juvenile courts
have the ability to impose either juvenile sentences, adult sentences, or a
combination of the two, while retaining juvenile court jurisdiction and
discretionary control over serious and violent juvenile offenders. 80 If
the juvenile offender fails to conform to the requirements of the blended
sentence disposition, the stay of the adult criminal sentence may be
revoked, and the juvenile offender may be transferred to an adult
correctional facility. 81
B. Jurisdictional Waiver and Blended Sentencing Structures in Juvenile
Court
Juvenile blended sentencing models were offered as an alternative to
the harsh practice of judicial transfer. The most common form of
transfer in the United States is judicial waiver, a practice provided for in
forty-six states. Under the judicial waiver method, the judge is the
primary decision-maker as to whether a child should be transferred to
the adult system. 82 The prosecutor also maintains discretion, as the
transfer process must be initiated by prosecutorial motion. Judicial
waiver is typically governed by state statute, outlining when waiver is
permitted. Typical waiver factors include the age of the juvenile
offender at the time of the offense, the nature of the offense committed,
and the juvenile’s past history of juvenile offenses. 83 Blended

77. See Redding and Howell, supra note 74, at 145–46.
78. PATRICIA TORBET, ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR JUV. JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS
AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996).
79. See Belluck, supra note 74.
80. See Redding and Howell, supra note 74.
81. See TORBET, supra note 78 (Blended sentencing structures offer juvenile offenders a “last
chance” at rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system—an incentive to respond to treatment in
order to avoid the consequences of an adult sentence.).
82. Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to
Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 385 (1998).
83. A PLAN FOR JUVENILE SENTENCING IN OHIO, OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION
28–29 (David J. Diroll ed. 1999). See also Redding and Howell, supra note 74.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
BARTH FINAL FORMAT 2

334

2/11/2011 3:59:09 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

sentencing models may also be governed by statute. The five basic
types of blended sentencing models are discussed in Subpart III(C).
C. Five Types of Blended Sentencing Models
As of 1999, twenty states had some form of blended sentencing
laws. 84 Five basic models of blended sentencing have emerged in recent
legislation: (1) juvenile–exclusive, 85 (2) juvenile–inclusive, (3)
juvenile–contiguous, 86 (4) criminal–exclusive, 87 and (5) criminal–
inclusive. 88 The underlying purpose of these models is to afford a
broader range of punishment options for violent juvenile offenders,
while maintaining rehabilitation as the central focus. 89 Ohio’s blended
sentencing structure is briefly summarized below.
1. Ohio’s Blended Sentencing Structure
Ohio adopted a juvenile–inclusive blended sentencing model. 90 The
juvenile–inclusive blend model allows the court to impose both a
juvenile and adult sentence, with the adult sentence conditionally
suspended unless the juvenile violates the terms of the juvenile sentence,
or commits a new offense. 91 As in states following a juvenile–exclusive

84. See Redding and Howell, supra note 74.
85. See A PLAN FOR JUVENILE SENTENCING IN OHIO, supra note 83, at 29. The juvenile–
exclusive blend model allows the juvenile court to impose either a juvenile disposition or an adult
sentence on the juvenile offender, but not a combination of the two.
86. See id. The juvenile–contiguous blend model allows for the court to impose a juvenile
sentence extending until age eighteen to twenty-one, when a transfer/sentencing hearing or other
procedures are triggered to determine if the juvenile offender should be transferred to serve an adult
sentence in the criminal justice system.
87. See id. Different from the three aforementioned blend models, the criminal–exclusive blend
model grants jurisdiction over the juvenile in the adult criminal court. The adult criminal court is
therefore given the authority to impose a sanction on the juvenile offender in either the juvenile or adult
correctional systems with jurisdiction continuing in adult criminal court.
88. See id. The criminal–inclusive blend model mirrors the juvenile–inclusive blend of
sentencing in that the criminal–inclusive blend model allows for imposition of both juvenile and adult
sentences upon the juvenile offender. Typically, the adult sentence is suspended unless the juvenile
offender violates the terms of probation. However, the notable difference between the criminal–
inclusive blend model and the juvenile–inclusive blend model is that under the criminal–inclusive blend
model the adult court, rather than the juvenile court, retains jurisdiction.
89. Jeffrey A. Butts & Ojmarrh Mitchell, Brick by Brick: Dismantling the Border Between
Juvenile and Adult Justice, 2 CRIM. JUST. 167, 188 (2000). Within the scope of the five basic models,
juvenile court justices might not “draw on the traditionally richer treatment and supervision resources
available in the juvenile justice system without having to sacrifice the lengthy periods of incarceration
once available only in the criminal court system.” Id.
90. A PLAN FOR JUVENILE SENTENCING IN OHIO, supra note 83, at 31.
91. See id. at 29–30.
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blend model, states that adopt a juvenile–inclusive blend model extend
juvenile court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders until the age of
twenty-one. 92
2. Ohio’s Serious Youthful Offender Statutes
In 2002, the Ohio Legislature adopted three statutes 93 to govern
juveniles charged as potential serious youthful offenders. Under Ohio’s
blended sentencing model, a juvenile charged as a potential serious
youthful offender does not face immediate bind-over to an adult court.
The case remains in the juvenile court. Section 2152.11(A) of the Ohio
Revised Code, describing dispositions for child adjudicated delinquent,
states a juvenile defendant who commits certain acts is eligible for “a
more restrictive disposition.” 94 The “more restrictive disposition” is a
serious youthful offender disposition, which includes a blended
sentence. 95 The adult sentence remains stayed unless the juvenile fails
to successfully complete his or her traditional juvenile disposition—a
determination made by a judge, not a jury. 96
Section 2152.11 of the Ohio Revised Code defines which acts
committed by a delinquent child are considered “enhanced.” 97 The
commission of one or more of the specified enhancements may lead to a
blended sentence. If the juvenile defendant meets the requirements of
serious youthful offender status, section 2152.11(B)–(G) lays down the
combination of factors that determine whether the juvenile defendant
will face a traditional juvenile disposition, a mandatory SYO
disposition, or a discretionary SYO disposition. 98 The factors primarily
92. See id.
93. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.11, 2152.13, 2152.14 (2002).
94. Id. § 2152.11(A).
95. Id. § 2152.13.
96. Id. § 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii).
97. See generally id. §§ 2152.13(A)(1)–(3). These acts include (1) the act charged against the
child would be an offense of violence if committed by an adult, (2) the child used, displayed,
brandished, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm and actually possessed a firearm during the
commission of the act charged, and (3) the child previously was admitted to a department of youth
services facility for the commission of an act that would have been aggravated murder, murder, a felony
of the first or second degree if committed by an adult, or an act that would have been a felony of the
third degree and an offense of violence if committed by an adult. Id.
98. Id. § 2152.13(B)–(G). D.H. was fifteen at the time of the commission of the act, the crime of
reckless homicide is considered an act of violence if committed by an adult, and D.H. used a firearm in
the commission of the crime. State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2775 (2009). However, D.H. had no prior contact with the juvenile system and had a clean record. Id.
Therefore, under this statutory scheme, in the case of D.H., the combination of D.H.’s offense and age
left the juvenile court with the discretion to impose a blended sentence. Id. at 211. The imposition of
D.H.’s blended sentence was not mandatory, and was solely at the discretion of the juvenile court judge.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
BARTH FINAL FORMAT 2

336

2/11/2011 3:59:09 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

consider the age of the juvenile and the seriousness of the offense.
If the prosecuting attorney intends to seek a SYO dispositional
sentence, the juvenile court is required to hold a preliminary hearing to
determine if probable cause exists that the child committed the act
charged and that the requirements of section 2152.11 are met. 99 A
juvenile defendant for whom a SYO dispositional sentence is sought has
the right to a grand jury determination of probable cause that the
juvenile defendant committed the act charged. 100 Once the juvenile
defendant is indicted, the juvenile is entitled to an open and speedy trial
by jury in juvenile court and is given a transcript of the proceedings. 101
The juvenile court must afford the juvenile defendant all the rights
afforded a person who is prosecuted for committing a crime, including
the right to counsel and the right to raise the issue of competency. The
juvenile may not waive the right to counsel. 102
If the juvenile defendant is adjudicated a delinquent child for
committing an act under circumstances that permit, but do not require,
the juvenile court to impose on the juvenile defendant a SYO
dispositional sentence under section 2152.11, section 2152.13,
describing the SYO dispositional sentences, sets forth the factors a
juvenile court must consider before imposing a discretionary blended
sentence. The juvenile court is required to consider several factors
including: (1) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (2) the
history of the child; (3) the length of time; (4) the level of security; and
(5) the types of programming and resources available in the juvenile
system. 103 If an adult sentence is imposed in addition to a traditional
juvenile sentence, the juvenile court shall stay the adult portion of the
SYO dispositional sentence, pending the successful completion of the
juvenile disposition. 104

Id.
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(B) (2002).
100. Id. § 2152.13(C)(1).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2152.13(C)(2).
103. Id. § 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i).
104. Id. § 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii). Note that section 2152.14(E) of the Ohio Revised Code governs
instances when a juvenile court may invoke the adult potion of a serious youthful offender’s sentence for
failure to successfully complete the traditional juvenile disposition. The statute requires a finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is “unlikely to be rehabilitated during the remaining
period of juvenile jurisdiction” and that the juvenile has engaged in further bad conduct pursuant to
section 2512.14(A) or (B). See also State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2775 (2009).
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D. Do Blended Sentencing Structures Achieve Their Goals?
As discussed in Subpart III(A), blended sentencing structures are
considered a compromise—combining the goal of juvenile offender
rehabilitation with the public’s need for accountability and punishment
of crimes committed by juveniles. 105 However, the question remains as
to whether new blended sentencing models “ultimately provide[] serious
young offenders with one last chance at rehabilitation, or whether [they]
consign[] less serious youths to the adult corrections system.” 106 Critics
have argued juvenile blended sentencing models actually serve to widen
the net of juveniles subject to adult sentences, serving as a supplement to
existing transfer laws. 107 Therefore, critics posit the argument that
blended sentencing models are more detrimental to juvenile offenders
than helpful. This argument will be discussed in more detail in Part V of
this Comment.
IV. OHIO’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The stated goal of the Ohio juvenile justice system is “[t]o provide for
the care, protection, and mental and physical development of
children.” 108 This goal reflects the historical, overarching goals of the
national juvenile justice system. 109 Subpart IV(A) will discuss the
history and development of the juvenile justice system in Ohio, and
analyze the methods Ohio presently uses to address serious and violent
crimes committed by juveniles, particularly focusing on Ohio’s SYO
Statutes.
A. History and Development of the Juvenile Justice System in Ohio
The foundation for the Ohio juvenile justice system was first laid in
1857 when the Ohio General Assembly made a provision for the special
disposition of infants accused of crime. 110 In 1902, the first Ohio
105. See TORBET, supra note 78.
106. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1124 (1995).
107. See Redding and Howell, supra note 74, at 160.
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(A) (2002).
109. See generally Mack, supra note 13.
110. See In re Alger, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969).
In legislation establishing houses of refuge, it was added that ‘the grand jurors may, in
their discretion, instead of finding an indictment against the accused [infant], return to the
court that it appears to them that the accused is a suitable person to be committed to the
guardianship of the directors of the house of refuge.’
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Juvenile Court was established in Cuyahoga County and subsequent
State General Assemblies enacted extensive, substantive juvenile
legislation that conferred juvenile jurisdiction on courts throughout the
state. 111 Although subsequent enactments have refined the system, the
essential elements of the Ohio Juvenile Court system have remained
unchanged. 112 As in the federal system, the Ohio Juvenile Court system
does not recognize a constitutional right of juvenile offenders to trial by
jury. 113
The right to trial by jury for juvenile offenders was first challenged in
the 1869 Ohio Supreme Court case Prescott v. State. 114 In Prescott,
Benjamin Prescott, a fourteen-year-old boy accused of burning a barn,
challenged his commitment to the reform farm upon the finding of the
grand jury. 115 Prescott argued the court erred in depriving him of a trial
by an impartial jury, in derogation of Article I, Section Five of the Ohio
constitution. 116 The Prescott Court disagreed with Prescott’s claims,
holding that the nature of a juvenile proceeding “is neither a criminal
prosecution, nor a proceeding according to the course of the common
law, in which the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed.” 117
B. State v. D.H.
One of the most recent cases before the Ohio Supreme Court
challenged whether juvenile offenders have a constitutional right to a

Id. at 810 (quoting 54 Ohio Laws, pp. 163, 166, § 8). See also Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869).
This provision remained the foundation of Ohio’s juvenile law for over eighty years until a major
revision of the Ohio Juvenile Code in 1937, which granted the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over
juvenile offenders. In re Alger, 249 N.E.2d at 810.
111. In re Alger, 249 N.E.2d at 810.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 814. The Ohio Supreme Court asserted they can perceive no benefit worthy of
destroying a juvenile’s traditional entitlement to special status which might accrue to an alleged
delinquent from a jury trial. Unquestionably, fair adjudication can be had for a child represented by
counsel, from a judge applying proper rules of evidence, and a proper standard of proof. Id.
114. Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869).
115. Id. at 185.
116. Id. at 187–88.
117. Id. The Prescott Court further observed the juvenile court proceeding does not warrant a jury
trial because the proceeding is purely statutory. Id. The Prescott Court further noted the commitment,
in cases like the present, is not designed as a punishment for crime, but to place minors of the
description, and for the causes specified in the statute, under the guardianship of the public authorities
named, for proper care and discipline, until they are reformed, or arrive at the age of majority. Id. The
institution to which they are committed is a school, not a prison; nor is the character of their detention
affected by the fact that it is also a place where juvenile convicts may be sent, who would otherwise be
condemned to confinement in the common jail or the penitentiary. Id.
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jury trial. State v. D.H. 118 examined a very narrow sub-holding of the
juvenile jury trial right. State v. D.H. specifically challenged a juvenile
offender’s right to jury determination on the imposition of a SYO
dispositional sentence. 119
1. Factual Background
The conviction in State v. D.H. stems from a December 28, 2004
incident where D.H., a fifteen-year-old minor, fired a gun into a crowd
of people outside the home of his friend, Christopher Harris. 120 A few
months prior to the incident Harris had a disagreement with another
youth, Preston “PJ” Smith. On the day of the incident, Harris
telephoned PJ and told him to apologize for his prior behavior. Instead
of apologizing, PJ decided to fight Harris and showed up at the Harris
home with an entourage. In preparation for the fight, Harris located his
father’s loaded gun, a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun and
phoned D.H. When D.H. arrived at Harris’s home, Harris gave the
loaded gun to D.H. 121 Another youth, Brandon Russell, appeared soon
after with his companion and both punched Harris. Harris turned to run
away, slipped, and heard gunfire. Harris looked up to find D.H. on the
porch with Harris’s father’s gun pointed in the air. 122 D.H.’s gunfire
struck and killed Harris’s sister, Kiera. Another youth, Preston Smith,
was shot in the leg. 123
2. Juvenile Court Procedural History
D.H. was indicted on several charges stemming from the incident.
The charges, totaling six counts, included murder with a firearm
specification, attempted murder with a firearm specification, and
118. State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2775 (2009).
119. See generally id. D.H. challenged his conviction on two grounds. This Comment only
discusses D.H.’s challenge as to whether juveniles charged under section 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i) of the
Ohio Revised Code have the right to a jury determination at the dispositional level, as opposed to a
judge determining the sentence. D.H.’s other challenge related to whether constitutional jury trial rights
apply in a pre-Foster sentencing. The D.H. court held that constitutional jury trial rights do not apply, in
a pre-Foster sentencing, to findings that a juvenile court has made under Ohio’s adult felony sentencing
statutes when the juvenile court imposes the stayed adult potion of a serious youthful offender
dispositional sentence pursuant to section 2152.13. See generally State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio
2006).
120. See D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 210.
121. Merit Brief of Appellee, the State of Ohio at 1, State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio 2003)
(Nos. 2007-0291, 2007-0472), 2007 WL 2905855.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 2–3.
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felonious assault with a firearm specification. 124 Each count alleged that
D.H., fifteen years old at the time of the offenses and using a firearm,
was subject to a SYO disposition pursuant to sections 2152.11 and
2152.13 of the Ohio Revised Code. 125
D.H. requested to have a jury trial. Under the statute, a juvenile who
is tried as a serious youthful offender is entitled to a jury trial at the
adjudicatory stage. 126 The jury determined that D.H. was a delinquent
minor child for committing the offense of reckless homicide, 127 that
D.H. was fifteen years old at the time of the offense, and that D.H. had a
“firearm on or about his person or under his control and
did . . . display, . . . brandish, indicate he possessed and/or used the
firearm in the commission of the offense.” 128 The culmination of the
jury’s findings made D.H. eligible for a SYO disposition, a blended
sentence. 129 However, under the SYO statute, D.H.’s age and the nature
of his crime rendered the imposition of the adult portion of the sentence
discretionary, rather than mandatory. 130
At the sentencing hearing, the juvenile court considered the
circumstances and facts of the case, D.H.’s history, and the fact that any
adult sentence would be stayed or suspended pending a juvenile
disposition. 131 Citing the “seriousness of this incident,” 132 the juvenile
court imposed a blended sentence. 133
The juvenile court committed D.H. to the legal custody of the Ohio
Department of Youth Services (ODYS) for three years on the gun
specification, followed by a minimum term of six months with a
maximum period not to exceed D.H.’s twenty-first birthday on the
124. D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 210. D.H. was formally indicted on two counts of murder with a firearm
specification in violation of sections 2903.02(A) and 2941.145 of the Ohio Revised Code, two counts of
attempted murder with firearm specifications in violation of section 2923.02 as it relates to sections
2903.02 and 2941.145, and two counts of felonious assault with firearm specifications in violation of
sections 2903.11 and 2941.145. Id.
125. Id. Sections 2152.11 and 2152.13 will be discussed in detail in subpart IV(C) of this
Comment. In short, a serious youthful offender disposition consists of a “blended” sentence: a
traditional juvenile disposition and a stayed adult sentence. The court may choose to enforce the adult
potion of the sentence at a later time—i.e. when the offender maxes out of the juvenile facility—if the
juvenile engages in behavior that indicates the juvenile disposition has been unsuccessful in
rehabilitating the juvenile offender.
126. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(C)(1) (2002).
127. Reckless homicide is a third-degree felony, and is a lesser included offense of murder and
felony murder. See id. § 2903.041. See also D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 210.
128. D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 210.
129. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.11(A)(2), (F)(2), 2152.13 (2002).
130. D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 210–11. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.11(F)(2).
131. D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 211.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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reckless homicide charge. As for the adult sentence, the juvenile court
imposed a total of six years’ confinement on D.H.: a single three-year
prison sentence for D.H.’s reckless homicide, and an additional threeyear prison sentence on the accompanying firearm specification. It is
important to note that the adult “three-year prison sentence for D.H.’s
reckless homicide” is above the one-year, statutory-minimum prison
sentence for such felonies. 134 In accordance with the SYO statute’s
language, 135 the juvenile court stayed the adult portion of the sentence,
pending D.H.’s successful completion of the juvenile disposition. 136
3. D.H.’s Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, D.H. argued only a jury may make the factual
determinations required under section 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i), the SYO
statute, that lead to the discretionary imposition of an adult sentence.
The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. 137 The
Supreme Court of Ohio denied D.H.’s discretionary appeal, and held
that “constitutional jury trial rights do not apply . . . to findings that a
juvenile court has made under Ohio’s adult felony sentencing statutes
when the juvenile court imposed the adult portion of a serious youthful
offender dispositional sentence pursuant to [section] 2152.13.” 138
V. EXTENDING COMPLETE JURY TRIAL RIGHTS TO JUVENILES
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the
assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The
child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.’ 139

Part V advocates that the rights of juvenile offenders sentenced under
the discretionary SYO statute would best be served with complete jury
trial rights at both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of the trial.
To support this premise, Part V examines the holding of the McKeiver
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii) (2002).
D.H., 901 N.E.2d at 211.
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 212.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (emphasis added).
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case, and reviews juvenile jury rights in other states. As additional
support, Part V cites the plain language of the SYO statute, and the notes
of the Ohio Sentencing Commission Report regarding blended
sentencing. Part V then examines the current state of ODYS, in
particular the ongoing class action S.H. v. Stickrath. 140 Part V also
briefly considers the proposition that statutes such as Ohio’s SYO
statute are wholly in opposition to the stated rehabilitative goals of the
Ohio juvenile justice system, such that the abolishment of the state
juvenile justice system may better protect Ohio’s youth from arbitrary
and unnecessary punishment.
A. Imposition of Adult Punishment Equals Access to Adult Rights
Ohio juvenile offenders receiving a discretionary blended sentence
should be entitled to a jury trial right at the dispositional stage of the
trial. Under the SYO statute, Ohio juvenile defendants adjudicated
delinquent under the statute are afforded a jury trial right at the
adjudicatory stage of the trial. 141 However, jury trial rights are also
essential at the dispositional phase of the trial, as the applicable SYO
statute requires the judge to consider several factors in determining
whether or not to impose a blended sentence, including whether the
juvenile has been rehabilitated. 142
1. McKeiver Did Not Consider Juvenile Blended Sentencing Structures
As discussed in Subpart II(C), recognizing significant deficiencies in
the juvenile court system, the Supreme Court systematically extended
procedural constitutional protections to juvenile offenders.
The
procedural constitutional protections include the right to counsel, the
right to notice of charges, the right to confrontation and crossexamination, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to a
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 143 In McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court stopped short of extending a
constitutional jury trial right to juveniles. 144
Decided in 1971, the McKeiver plurality considered a juvenile justice
system void of blended sentencing structures such as Ohio’s current
SYO statutes. The McKeiver Court’s view that juvenile proceedings are
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

S.H. v. Stickrath, 251 F.R.D. 293 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(C)(1) (2002).
Id. § 2152.13 (D)(2)(a)(i).
See generally subpart II(C) of this Comment.
See generally McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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civil in nature, or at best quasi-criminal, in addition to the belief that
juvenile courts do not impose punishment, is not in line with the present
realities of Ohio’s juvenile justice system, specifically the discretionary
serious youthful offender disposition. 145 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has never determined whether a minor has a Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial when that minor receives a criminal
sentence of imprisonment for a term of years to be served in an adult
institution imposed by a juvenile court. 146
The McKeiver plurality held the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
does not apply when a juvenile court may only impose a traditional
juvenile disposition. 147 McKeiver stated juvenile adjudicatory hearings
do not constitute “criminal prosecutions” for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. 148 However, Ohio’s SYO statute mirrors the punishment,
procedures, and rights afforded defendants in a criminal prosecution.
For example, section 2152.13 requires indictment, speedy trial, jury trial
at the adjudicatory phase, and allows for stayed adult punishment of
punitive incarceration in SYO proceedings. 149 Given these factors, it
seems natural to extend complete jury trial rights to juvenile defendants
sentenced under Ohio’s SYO statute, especially when juvenile
defendants face adult imprisonment, regardless of whether the adult
portion of the sentence is initially stayed.
A few state courts have examined the issue of whether McKeiver
applies in juvenile proceedings when commitment to an adult criminal
institution is permitted. Two such cases, In re L.M. 150 and In re Jeffrey
C., 151 are outlined below.
In the case of In re L.M., a Kansas juvenile challenged the
constitutionality of Kansas state court precedent denying complete jury
trial rights to juvenile offenders. 152 The Supreme Court of Kansas
recognized that amendments to the original 1982 Kansas Juvenile
Offender Code (KJOC) “have eroded the benevolent parens patriae
character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system.” 153
Noting the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult
145. See generally id. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Ohio State University Justice for
Children Project in Support of Petitioner at 3, State v. D.H., 129 S. Ct. 2775 (2009) (No. 08-9702), 2009
WL 1339249.
146. Brief Amicus Curiae, D.H., 129 S. Ct. 2775 (No. 08-9702).
147. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540–45.
148. Id. at 550.
149. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13 (2002).
150. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008).
151. In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d 4 (N.H. 2001).
152. In re L.M., 186 P. 3d at 165.
153. Id. at 170.
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criminal system, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded a minor in a
juvenile proceeding has a right to a jury trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as
under the Kansas state constitution. 154
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reached a similar conclusion
in In re Jeffrey C., in which a juvenile defendant challenged his
confinement to an adult correctional facility without first being afforded
a jury trial. 155 The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the
argument presented in McKeiver that juvenile proceedings are
fundamentally different from adult criminal trials, 156 and held that when
commitment to an adult criminal facility is permitted, the juvenile
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury. 157 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court further asserted that it is a well-settled
principle that all defendants facing the possibility of incarceration are
entitled to a trial by jury, and that imprisonment in an adult facility
fundamentally changes the nature of the underlying proceedings. 158
In re L.M. 159 and In re Jeffrey C. 160 support the premise that juveniles
sentenced under Ohio’s SYO statute should be extended complete jury
trial rights. The imposition of an adult sentence, regardless of whether it
is stayed, significantly alters the nature of the juvenile proceeding to that
of an adult criminal proceeding. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that the reasoning of McKeiver no longer applies to the imposition of a
discretionary serious youthful offender punishment. The McKeiver
plurality reasoned that a jury trial right is the one due process right that
would most disrupt the uniqueness of the juvenile court process. 161
However, the punitive nature of the SYO statute, especially the
imposition of adult prison time, has destroyed any vestiges of the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court system. Without the essential
procedural due process right of a jury trial, juveniles sentenced under the
discretionary SYO statute become vulnerable to arbitrary and
unnecessary punishment.

154.
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157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d at 5.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971).
In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d at 6.
Id.
In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 164.
In re Jeffrey C., 781 A.2d at 4.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540.
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2. The Plain Meaning of Ohio’s SYO Statutes
The plain meaning of Ohio’s SYO statutes indicates that serious
youthful offenders are entitled to jury trials. Section 2152.13(C)(1)
states that once a child is indicted, charged by information, or is eligible
for a SYO disposition as determined by the juvenile court, “the child is
entitled to an open and speedy trial by jury in juvenile court.” 162 In
addition, the statute states that a juvenile in a serious youthful offender
proceeding has “all rights afforded a person who is prosecuted for
committing a crime including the right to counsel . . . .” 163 In fact,
according to the statutory language, the juvenile defendant may not
waive the right to counsel. 164
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission (Commission) appears to
support the proposition that the plain language of the SYO statutes
supports complete jury trial rights. The Commission noted that because
an SYO-eligible offender could receive an adult sentence, the juvenile
should be given rights akin to those granted to adults appearing in
criminal court, including the right “to an open, speedy, jury trial.” 165
The Commission recognized that guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for
juveniles troubles some juvenile courts. In a survey conducted by the
Commission, juvenile judges were asked whether juvenile offenders
should be given a jury trial right. Of the judges surveyed, 89.5% said
“no.” 166 However, 94.9% of judges responded that there should be a
mechanism for transferring juveniles from DYS to the adult prison
system. 167
Despite these apparent concerns, the Commission
affirmatively concluded “any system that allows adult punishment must
recognize a right to a trial by jury.” 168 In summation, following the
plain language of the SYO statute and the intentions of the Ohio
Criminal Sentencing Commission, complete jury trial rights for juvenile
offenders sentenced under the discretionary SYO statute are essential.
B. The Ohio Department of Youth Services is Broken
Under the SYO statute, if a juvenile defendant is eligible for a
discretionary SYO dispositional sentence, as in the case of D.H., then
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(C)(1) (2002).
Id. § 2152.13(C)(2) (emphasis added).
Id.
A PLAN FOR JUVENILE SENTENCING IN OHIO, supra note 83, at 32.
Id. at 32–33. Note, the survey does not indicate the reasoning behind the strong opposition.
Id. at 33.
Id.
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the juvenile defendant can only be given an adult criminal sentence if
the juvenile court makes findings consistent with the statute. 169 One of
the factors the juvenile judge must consider is whether “the types of
programming and resources available in the juvenile justice system
alone” 170 are adequate to meet the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system. 171 If the juvenile court does not make the requisite
findings, the court may not enforce an adult criminal sentence. 172
However, ODYS is currently under a federal court order, 173 and is
unable to provide adequate programming and resources—one of the key
factors a juvenile judge must consider when deciding whether to impose
a discretionary SYO sentence. Some practitioners, including the courtappointed Independent Fact-Finder, found the DYS system “utterly
deficient” and in need of “basic overhauling.” 174 Arguably, the ODYS
system is broken. Given the status of the ODYS system, jury
determination of whether the juvenile defendant meets the statutory
factors for imposition of a discretionary SYO dispositional sentence
would better serve the notions of fundamental fairness and due process.
In support of this Comment’s claim that ODYS is broken, this Section
examines the Final Fact-Finding Report of S.H. v. Stickrath. 175
S.H. v. Stickrath is a recent class action filed by an association
alleging a myriad of unconstitutional practices in ODYS facilities. 176
The issues raised “include the application by staff of unnecessary force;
arbitrary and excessive use of isolation and seclusion; arbitrary and
excessive discipline; inadequate mental health, medical, and dental care;
inadequate education services; inadequate structured programming;
broadly inadequate training of staff; an unsafe living environment; and a
dysfunctional grievance system.” 177 The Final Fact–Finding report
sustained each area of the plaintiff’s complaint. 178
In the area of structured programming, which is one of the factors a
juvenile judge must consider before deciding to impose a discretionary
serious youthful offender disposition, the Final Fact-Finding report
found ODYS lacks academic and career technical counseling, making
re-entry into society after detention difficult for some juvenile offenders
169.
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178.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i) (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 2152.13(D)(2)(b).
S.H. v. Stickrath, 251 F.R.D. 293 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
FRED COHEN, FINAL FACT-FINDING REPORT: S.H. V. STICKRATH iv (2008).
Stickrath, 251 F.R.D. at 293.
Id.
COHEN, supra note 174, at i (emphasis added).
Id.
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and impossible for others. 179 The report also found the ODYS education
system to be “utterly deficient” in human and physical resources devoted
to educating to ODYS youth. For example, on a randomly selected day,
43% (598 youth) were found to receive less instruction than a legally
mandated, full school day. 180 Therefore, under the discretionary SYO
statute, a judge may be unable to accurately consider whether a juvenile
has been rehabilitated through access to ODYS programming in order to
avoid the imposition of the stayed adult sentence.
Although there is no current alternative to ODYS, if a jury was
allowed to decide whether to impose an adult sentence—rather than the
judge, as per the discretionary SYO statute—the jury may be better
suited to weigh the seriousness of the offense without having to consider
factors such as the current status of the DYS system, which are outside
of the juvenile offender’s control.
C. Moving Towards the Abolishment of the Juvenile Justice System
The import of blended sentencing structures such as Ohio’s SYO
statutes shift the original goals of the juvenile justice system away from
the rehabilitative model and towards a retributive model of juvenile
justice. Some scholars, most notably Barry Feld, 181 have advocated for
the abolishment of the juvenile justice system so that juveniles can enjoy
the same due process rights as adults. According to Professor Feld,
“[n]o compelling reasons exist to maintain separate from an adult
criminal court, a punitive juvenile court whose only remaining
distinctions are its persisting procedural deficiencies.” 182
Ohio has given no indication that it intends to abolish its current
juvenile justice system. Despite the shift from rehabilitative towards
retributive models of juvenile justice, clear drawbacks exist to
abolishing the juvenile justice system. 183 However, the implications of
both the mandatory and discretionary Ohio SYO statutes illustrate that
juvenile defendants may be better protected by the adult system than by
the existing juvenile system. In the adult system, juvenile defendants
facing the imposition of adult time would be afforded a mandatory and
complete jury trial right.
179. Id. at iv.
180. Id.
181. See generally Barry Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
182. Id. at 69.
183. For a summary of the arguments against abolishment of the juvenile justice system, see, for
example, Claudia Noriega, Stick a Fork In It: Is Juvenile Justice Done?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
669, 696–98 (2000).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court recognized, “[t]here is
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.” 184 Ohio’s SYO statutes certainly fall into the
“worst of both worlds” category. Although it may not be time to abolish
the juvenile justice system, cases such as State v. D.H. illustrate, that
Ohio juvenile defendants receiving a discretionary serious youthful
offender sentence would be best served with complete jury trial rights at
every stage of the trial, for “trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental
to the American scheme of justice.” 185

184. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
185. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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